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Abstract 
 
We find that generalized purchasing power parity does not hold for Mercosur, and 
thus that the South American trade group does not constitute an optimum currency 
area.  We also find that the role of the United States cannot be neglected in the 
region, and that high short run volatility of real exchange rates is accompanied by 
slow adjustment processes of between 2 and 16 years (PPP puzzle). 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In an optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961) efficiency is maximized if the area 
shares a single currency.  One rationale behind the creation of the euro, for 
instance, is that the individual countries of Europe do not each form an optimum 
currency area, but that Europe as a whole does.  Even if the fundamental 
economic variables determining real exchange rates are nonstationary (Da Silva, 
2002), and then the real rates are nonstationary, the fundamentals can still be 
sufficiently integrated, as in a currency area.  Here the real rates will share 
common trends (Enders and Hurn, 1994).  The existence of at least one 
cointegration vector in a set of national economies’ nonstationary series suggests 
both an optimum currency area and generalized purchasing power parity (G-PPP).  
Our purpose in this paper is to check whether Mercosur (the South American 
trade group) is an optimum currency area in that sense. 
The idea of G-PPP was pioneered by Enders and Hurn (1994), who apply 
it to Pacific Rim countries.  The G-PPP was rejected and they found the Pacific 
Rim nations not to constitute an optimum currency area. Rather, each country has 
its own real rate influenced by the larger trading partners.  Enders and Hurn 
(1997) also tested the G-PPP to the G7 countries.  They found one cointegration 
vector at the 5 percent significance level, which means that those countries’ real 
exchange rates seem to be linked by a single long run equilibrium relationship, 
and a shock to any one rate is likely to affect the long run values of the others.  
Liang (1999) found that the G-PPP holds for China, Hong Kong, Japan, and the 
United States, and then that those countries constitute an optimum currency area.  
Bernstein (2000) tested the G-PPP for the euro area and found that the null of 
 noncointegration cannot be rejected.  However he also found that Germany and 
the United Kingdom affect the other countries’ real exchange rates.  Lee (2003) 
found that Australia, New Zealand, and Japan comprise an optimum currency 
area, but this is not so of Australia, New Zealand, and the US.  And Kawasaki and 
Ogawa (2006) found that East Asia countries fail to constitute an optimum 
currency area. 
 As for Mercosur, the southern cone customs union was founded by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 1991.  Its original intent was to 
implant European-style integration and to stand for open trade and regional 
integration led by the private sector.  In 1996 it committed itself to ‘the full 
respect of democratic institutions’.  Yet summits of Mercosur are usually devoted 
to rhetoric and to small steps toward achieving economic integration.  As a result, 
Mercosur has been trouble-plagued.  Venezuela became a full member of 
Mercosur in July 2007.  Venezuela’s membership expanded Mercosur to 250m 
people and $1.1 trillion of GDP.  The admission of Venezuela is a challenge to 
Mercosur’s identity because Venezuelan president Chavez’s desire is to forge a 
united hemispheric geopolitical ‘resistance’ to the US.  There is a risk that 
Venezuela’s political goals might undermine the objective of economic 
integration.  Yet there are economic benefits of cooperation with Venezuela as 
well.  Some of Venezuela’s oil is already flowing to south, and the country can 
become the hub of a regional energy network. Argentina and Brazil invited 
Bolivia to join the group, but nationalist president Morales would strengthen anti-
Americanism.  Thus Mercosur is becoming an ‘anti-imperialist political block’, 
and Fidel Castro remarked that a ‘social Mercosur’ will ‘change the world’.  A 
deal between Mercosur and the US, already unlikely, now looks even more so. 
 Brazilian president Lula observed that ‘neither the US nor Brazil is making the 
FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) a priority’.  In a recent poll, 64% of 
Argentines, 57% of Brazilians, 53% of Mexicans, and 51% of Chileans said they 
had a ‘mainly negative’ view of American influence.  The current multilateral 
mess in trade could sharpen the European Union’s appetite for a deal with 
Mercosur, but this also seems elusive thanks to the EU’s resistance on reducing 
farm subsidies.  Uruguay sought permission from Mercosur to sign separate trade 
agreements, principally with the US.  If that is not forthcoming, Uruguay could 
leave the group.  Mercosur’s membership would then shrink back to four. 
 Previous work on Mercosur roughly suggests that it is still a mirage.  
Hallwood et al. (2004) examined the case for either a Latin American monetary 
union (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) or monetary union with 
the US through official dollarization. Using VAR techniques they found that 
macroeconomic shocks are so highly asymmetric in Latin America and between 
Latin American countries and the US as to make monetary union or official 
dollarization questionable.  This contrasts with Fratianni (2004) and Alexander 
and Von Furstenberg (2000), who argued that Mercosur members are more suited 
to creating a common currency than to adopting the US dollar.  This is so because 
Mercosur is a larger trading partner for all Mercosur members other than Brazil.  
The endogenous optimum currency area hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998) 
asserts that there is a positive association between trade intensity and business 
cycle correlation.  Yet empirical evidence suggests that this hypothesis ought to 
be set aside (Hallwood et al., 2004; Ahumada and Martirena-Mantel, 2001; 
Licandro-Ferrando, 2000).  Intraregional trade in Mercosur is still modest, thanks 
mainly to the low openness of the Argentine and Brazilian economies (Machinea, 
 2004).  The Brazilian economy can be considered more relatively diversified than 
Argentina’s (Barenboim, 2004) and, as a result, less prone to big asymmetries of 
shocks (Kenen, 1969; Calderon et al., 2007).  But increasing intra-Mercosur trade 
is unlikely to make it more suitable for monetary union because macroeconomic 
shocks between the countries and between them and the US do not become more 
symmetric (Hallwood et al., 2004).  This contrasts with the experience of the 
European countries (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994). 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will present data.  
Section 3 will analyze the data.  And Section 4 will conclude. 
 
2. Data 
 
We took quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 2006Q3 for the Mercosur countries, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela as well as the 
United States, considered as the benchmark country.  The series of consumer price 
index and average dollar price of the Mercosur currencies were taken from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  We took CPIs rather than wholesale 
price indices because the latter are missing for Argentina and Paraguay for the 
entire sample period.  Yet we could replicate our results using CPIs for Argentina 
and Paraguay together with WPIs for the other countries (not shown). 
The series of real exchange rate were built according to 
( )* *, , , , ,ln ( CPI ) CPIi t i t t i t i t t i te s s p p= × = + − , where ,i te  is the natural log of the real 
exchange rate in country i  at time period t , ,i ts  is the nominal exchange rate 
(dollar price of country i ’s currency), ,i tp  is a country i ’s natural log of the 
 consumer price index, and *tp  is the US consumer price index.  Figure 1 displays 
the real exchange rates.  A first look suggests nonstationarity in the rates. 
 
3. Analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the results of unit roots tests.  Dickey-Pantula (DP) (1987) tests 
suggest that the series do not present two or more unit roots.  Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) (1979, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) tests both suggest that 
the null of unit root cannot be rejected for the series.  Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock 
(ERS) (1996) tests (that are more appropriate for slow adjustment processes) were 
also performed for the cases where the autoregressive parameter in the ADF tests 
fell above 0.9.  The null of unit root was rejected for Argentina, Venezuela (5 
percent significant), and Uruguay (10 percent significant).  Overall the unit root 
tests did not provide evidence of rejection of the null of nonstationarity of the 
series at one percent. 
We also performed Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root tests, which track 
structural breaks.  Thanks to the series’ volatility, it is difficult to know whether a 
break occurs in either intercept or trend.  So Table 2 displays all the possible 
cases.  Only for Venezuela the null of unit root with structural break was rejected 
at 5 percent for the series with intercept and joint change in intercept and trend.  
The break occurred in the fourth quarter of 1986.  In the fourth quarter of 1982, 
Brazil and Uruguay shared a real shock, which hit Paraguay in the first quarter of 
1984.  Also, the shock in the first quarter of 1985 in Brazil may have triggered the 
fourth quarter of 1986’s Paraguayan shock.  Brazil’s shock in the second quarter 
of 1989 seems to have caused a fluctuation in Argentina’s series in the second 
 quarter of 1990.  Overall the effect of Brazilian shocks on the others reflects 
Brazil’s role of major trading partner. 
 Table 3 presents the results of Perron (1997) tests for two innovation 
outliers (IO1 and IO2) and one additive outlier (AO).  Only for Argentina the null 
of unit root with break was rejected for the IO1 and IO2 at 5 percent.  Brazil and 
Paraguay shared a real shock between the second quarter of 1982 and the fourth 
quarter of 1983.  Brazil’s shock in the fourth quarter of 1991 hit Uruguay in 1992.  
These also reflect Brazil’s influence. 
 For G-PPP to hold one would expect at least one stationary linear 
combination of the various bilateral rates between the members of a currency area 
(Enders and Hurn, 1994).  Here we performed cointegration tests through two 
types of models: (1) restricted deterministic linear trend (RDLT), and (2) 
deterministic linear trend (DLT). The former just considers one intercept in the 
deterministic linear trend, and the latter takes into account both intercept and time 
trend.  Table 4 shows the results of bivariate cointegration analysis.  Only for 
Argentina-Uruguay and Brazil-Paraguay the null of noncointegration was rejected 
at one and 5 percent respectively.  For those couples of countries the cointegration 
vectors were also significant (Tables 5 and 6).  Yet the trend parameters were 
nonsignificant and then we did not consider the DLT model.  To Argentina-
Uruguay the coefficients of adjustment speed of between 2 and 2.5 years were 
also significant (though of only 5 percent).  To Brazil-Paraguay only the 
coefficient for Paraguay was significant (5.2 years for the adjustment to 
complete).  The adjustment for Argentina-Uruguay was even faster than the usual 
finding of between 3 and 5 years, which is dubbed in literature ‘the PPP puzzle’, 
i.e. the difficult conciliation between high short run volatility of real exchange 
 rates and their slow adjustment process.  Figures 2 and 3 show the cointegration 
relationships. 
Then we took ‘core’ Mercosur and included Venezuela afterward.  (Chile 
and Bolivia presented stationary series and then could not even be considered in 
the cointegration analysis.)  Table 7 shows trace and max statistics for Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  In both RDLT and DLT models one 
cointegration vector was detected at the one percent significance level (Table 8).  
Figure 4 shows the cointegration relationship for those models.  Parameter 
estimates of β  employing Johansen (1988) technique were significant for the 
DLT model.  And the Schwarz criterion pointed to the selection of the DLT 
model.  The sum of the coefficients of the cointegration vectors departed from 
zero in both models, which means that the US cannot be left out from analysis.  
Mercosur countries depended on the US fundamentals.  However the coefficients 
of adjustment speed for Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay were nonsignificant.  The 
adjustment process was faster for the DLT model.  Overall we conclude that G-
PPP does not hold for core Mercosur. 
 As for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, both the 
trace and max statistics detected the presence of one cointegration vector for the 
RDLT model (5 percent significant).  For the DLT model the null of 
noncointegration was rejected only in the max statistics (Table 9).  Parameter 
estimates are presented in Table 10.  In both models the estimates of the 
coefficients of the cointegration vector for Paraguay and Venezuela were 
nonsignificant (and none of the models could be selected by Schwarz criterion).  
The coefficients of adjustment speed that were significant presented a low 
absolute value, thereby suggesting high persistence in real exchange rate reversion 
 (especially in the RDLT model).  Such high persistence spans from 4.3 to 16 years 
and is shown in Figure 5.  As can be seen, real exchange rate persistence is even 
higher in Mercosur than in the usual findings of the PPP puzzle.  Thus G-PPP 
does not hold for ‘full’ Mercosur.  It is not an optimum currency area.  This 
confirms previous suspicions (De Grauwe, 2005).  Yet weakening the case for 
Mercosur does not strengthen the case for the FTAA because the Americas are 
also unlikely to constitute an optimum currency area (Karras, 2003). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Stationarity analysis pointed to nonstationary real exchange rates in Mercosur.  
This allows one to perform cointegration analysis to assess G-PPP.  Our findings 
at first suggest that the null of noncointegration cannot be rejected for Mercosur.  
But one cannot jump to the conclusion that it constitutes an optimum currency 
area because most cointegration parameters were nonsignificant.  Moreover the 
role of the US cannot be neglected because the sum of parameters in the estimates 
of the cointegration vector departed from zero.  Incidentally we also found the 
PPP puzzle to hold for Mercosur and even higher real exchange rate persistence. 
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Figure 1. Real exchange rates against the US dollar for the Mercosur countries, 1970Q1−2006Q3 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cointegration relationship in the restricted deterministic linear trend model: Argentina 
and Uruguay 
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Figure 3. Cointegration relationship in the restricted deterministic linear trend model: Brazil and 
Paraguay 
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Figure 4.  Cointegration relationship in both (a) the restricted deterministic linear trend model and 
(b) the deterministic linear trend model: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
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Figure 5. Cointegration relationship in both (a) the restricted deterministic linear trend model and 
(b) the deterministic linear trend model: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
 
 
 Table 1. Unit root tests 
Country Series with DP ADF PP ERS 
ARG Intercept 10.771 −2.340 −2.497 −2.168** 
BRA Deterministic Linear Trend 9.133 −2.022 −1.833 −2.032 
PAR Deterministic Linear Trend 8.005 −2.563 −2.529 −1.712 
URU Intercept 10.485 −1.949 −2.283 −1.728* 
VEN Intercept 9.833 −2.324 −1.688 −2.336** 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% 
 
 
Table 2.  Zivot-Andrews stationarity tests 
Series with 
Country 
Intercept Trend Intercept and Trend 
t 
Minimum 
Statistics 
Date of 
Break 
3   −3.922 1990Q2 
 3  −2.661 1998Q1 ARG 
  3 −4.047 1990Q2 
3   −2.860 1982Q4 
 3  −2.523 1985Q1 BRA 
  3 −2.898 1989Q2 
3   −3.132 1986Q4 
 3  −3.046 1979Q2 PAR 
  3 −4.161 1984Q1 
3   −2.823 1982Q4 
 3  −2.608 2001Q3 URU 
  3 −2.851 1982Q4 
3   −5.167* 1986Q4 
 3  −3.340 1993Q1 VEN 
  3 −5.301* 1986Q4 
* significant at 5% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Perron stationarity tests 
Components of a Break 
Country Innovation 
Outlier 1 
Innovation 
Outlier 2 
Additive 
Outlier  
t 
Minimum 
Statistics 
 
Date of 
Break 
 
3   −5.198* 1989Q1 
 3  −5.166* 1989Q1 ARG 
  3 −2.983 1999Q2 
3   −4.091 1982Q2 
 3  −4.047 1991Q4 BRA 
  3 −2.886 2006Q2 
3   −3.295 1976Q2 
 3  −3.811 1983Q4 PAR 
  3 −3.439 1976Q2 
3   −3.879 1992Q1 
 3  −3.941 1992Q4 URU 
  3 −3.205 2004Q4 
3   −3.717 1986Q2 
 3  −3.415 1986Q2 VEN 
  3 −2.263 1996Q2 
* significant at 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4. Bivariate cointegration analysis 
 ARG BRA PAR URU 
λtrace 0    BRA 
λmax 0    
λtrace 0 1*   PAR λmax 0 1*   
λtrace 1** 0 0  URU λmax 1** 0 0  
λtrace 0 0 0 0 VEN 
λmax 0 0 0 0 
* significant at 5 %, ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 5.  Cointegration vector for Argentina and Uruguay 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
Intercept = 3.818 [8.111] 
 
 
Country 
 
iα  iβ  
ARG −0.103 [−1.894] 1 
URU 0.125 [5.317] −1.527 [−8.806] 
Total  −0.527 
Schwarz Criterion −2.962 
 
 
Table 6.  Cointegration vector for Brazil and Paraguay 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Model
Intercept = 12.248 
 
 
Country 
 
iα  iβ  
BRA 0.013 [0.953] 1 
PAR 0.048 [3.623] −1.574 [−5.643] 
Total  −0.574 
Schwarz Criterion −5.110 
 
 
Table 7.  Trace and lambda max statistics 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Deterministic Linear Trend H0 Trace Statistic Lambda Max Statistic Trace Statistic Lambda Max Statistic 
None  60.007**  33.666**  73.406**  40.696 
Up to 1  26.342  17.379  32.710  17.446 
Up to 2  8.963  6.996  15.265  8.352 
Up to 3  1.967  1.967  6.913  6.913 
** H0 is rejected at 1% 
 
 
 Table 8.  Cointegration vectors in the RDLT and DLT models 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend 
Model 
Deterministic Linear Trend Model 
Intercept = −27.006 Intercept = 4.226 
 Trend = −0.017 [−5.959] 
Country 
 
iα  iβ  iα  iβ  
ARG 0.011 [2.102] −10.568 [−5.895] −0.043 1.787 [6.223] 
BRA −0.001 1 −0.006 1 
PAR 0.003 [1.640] −1.457 [−1.168] −0.017  0.761 [2.218] 
URU −0.011 15.382 [5.200] 0.071 [5.668] −3.534 [−7,179] 
Total  4.357  0.014 
Schwarz −7.846 −7.860 
 
 
Table 9.  Trace and lambda max statistics 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend Deterministic Linear Trend H0 
Trace Statistic Lambda Max Statistic Trace Statistic Lambda Max Statistic 
None  72.867*  36.066*  86.421  40.870* 
Up to 1  36.801  20.562  45.551  22.567 
Up to 2  16.239  7.952  22.984  10.305 
Up to 3  8.286  5.349  12.680  7.819 
Up to 4  2.938  2.938  4.861  4.861 
* H0 is rejected at 5% 
 
 
Table 10.  Cointegration vectors for Mercosur 
Restricted Deterministic Linear Trend 
Model 
Deterministic Linear Trend 
Model 
Intercept = 53.739 Intercept = 27.787 
 Trend = −0.036 [−4.152] 
Country 
iα  iβ  iα  iβ  
ARG 0.023 [3.115] −7.885 [−6.100] −0.050 2.252 [6.221] 
BRA −0.001 [−0.413] 1 −0.004 1 
PAR 0.006 [2.075] −0.215 [−0.203] −0.015 0.683 [1.458] 
URU −0.015 [−4.487] 10.199 [4.970] 0.058 [5.429] −4.067 
VEN 0.002 [0.554] −3.150 [−1.669] −0.002 0.440 [0.825] 
Total  −0.051  0.014 
Schwarz 
Criterion 
−10.373 −10.372 
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